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Abstract Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to gen-
erate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major
existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our
first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of
our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of con-
sciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in
experience. This theory relies on the idea of ‘quoting’ sensory qualities, so is
dubbed the ‘quotational higher-order thought theory’. I argue that it can capture
something of the idea that we are ‘acquainted’ with our conscious states without
slipping beyond the pale for naturalists, whilst also providing satisfying treatments
of traditional problems for higher-order theories concerning representational mis-
match. The theory achieves this by abandoning a representational mechanism for
mental intentionality, in favour of one based on ‘embedding’.
Keywords Consciousness  Higher-order thought  Qualia  Representation 
Self-representation  Acquaintance
For those who believe consciousness requires higher-order cognitive access to a
mental state,1 two major questions concern, respectively, the relationship between
the accessing and accessed vehicles, and that between the accessing and accessed
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1 Cf. Gennaro (2012: 282). This mental operation on a mental state distinguishes ‘higher-order’ theories
of consciousness from ‘first-order’ ones (Tye 2000; Dretske 1995) where a mental state is conscious due
to its functional role, e.g. being poised to impact beliefs and desires.
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contents.2 Concerning the vehicles, especially interesting is the question how tightly
bound the accessed state is with the accessing state. Is the accessed mental state
wholly distinct from the accessing mental state, wholly identical to it, or somewhere
in between (and if the latter, where exactly in between)? Concerning the contents,
especially interesting is the question whether the accessing or accessed content
dominates in fixing what the subject finds in consciousness.
The literature on higher-order approaches to consciousness features a superficial
variety of positions on the vehicle issue, and an unacknowledged consensus on the content
issue. This paper adopts novel positions on both issues, yielding a newhigher-order theory
of consciousness. Our dialectic springs from the problem of mistargeted representations.
We see how this problem has generated consensus on the content issue, how this
consensus makes the variety of responses to the vehicle issue superficial, and how this
convergence is evitable by a different treatment of the difficulty. This leads to a higher-
order theorywhose distinctive feature, aswell as dealing neatlywithmistargeting, confers
an important virtue lacked by its peers. A statement of this virtue at the outset will appear
puzzling: the new theory manages to make our first-order sensory states3 genuinely
conscious. It will become clear the sense inwhich this is so, andwhy this virtue is peculiar
to the new theory. A third major question for higher-order approaches concerns the mode
by which the higher-order state accesses its first-order target. The consensus in the field is
that this mode is representation: we will find reason to challenge this consensus too.
1. Say someone tokens a red London bus-ish visual percept. For Rosenthal’s
higher-order thought (HOT) theory,4 what makes her conscious of that percept is
having a thought represent it appropriately.5 Without this HOT the red London bus-
ish percept is doomed to lie dormant in the subject’s visual cortex, its sensory
qualities unexperienced.6 HOTs are typically unconscious: what the subject is
conscious of is what the HOT represents. For the HOT to be conscious requires it to be
targeted by a still higher-order thought. This is Rosenthal’s model of introspection.
2. This elegant development of a venerable theory of consciousness7 has seen
several criticisms, perhaps the most important being the mistargeted representation
problem,8 influentially aired by Neander.9 In the good case, the red London bus-ish
2 There is also the question whether higher-order states are thought- or perception-like. I consider this in
§13. For discussion see Van Gulick (2000).
3 I use ‘sensory’ broadly, including perceptual and proprioceptive contents.
4 See Rosenthal (2005).
5 The subject must not be aware of the state as inferred; the HOT represents her as in the relevant state;
HOTs must be simultaneous with their targets (see Rosenthal 2005 for details).
6 Even if the percept is accessible otherwise, e.g. by the subject’s cognitive complex: Rosenthal’s
account of blindsight abilities is along these lines.
7 Locke and Aristotle, to name but two, held something similar. See Caston (2002).
8 There is also, notably, the ‘rock’ problem (Goldman 1993; Stubenberg 1998), but I lack space to examine
it. One version asks how a mental state can be made conscious by our thinking about it when rocks aren’t
made conscious by our thinking about them. My answer is similar to that of Gennaro (2004, 2012) and Van
Gulick (2004), but the reader must await the positive view (§§ 9–13) to glimpse how it works. The gist is
that rocks cannot form part of the mental complexes needed for conscious states, being outside the head
(not to mention rocky!). Consciousness of a state requires it to be ‘neurologically grabbable’.
9 Neander (1998). See also Byrne (1997).
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percept is present while a HOT suitably represents there to be such a percept. But
sensory state and HOT are wholly separate states for Rosenthal, creating the
possibility of two sorts of slippage. In misrepresentation the percept is unfaithfully
represented: e.g. the HOT represents a blue London bus-ish visual percept. In
targetlessness the percept is missing, nonetheless the HOT represents there to be a
red London bus-ish percept.
Rosenthal’s challenge is what to say about such cases. Take misrepresentation:
he could either say the subject experiences red London bus-ishly, or blue London
bus-ishly.10 If he gives the former response one wonders what the point of the HOT
is in HOT theory. But if he gives the latter response, it seems to make the sensory
component redundant in generating a conscious state. Concerning targetlessness, the
question is whether a conscious state obtains in the absence of the sensory state,
with similar dilemmatic options facing Rosenthal in reply. However he responds,
Rosenthal seems left maintaining that one component of his HOT theory is
surprisingly under-involved in the production of consciousness.
3. Rosenthal is clear about his preferred treatment of these cases. He explicitly
entrusts HOTs with generating the ‘subjective mental appearances’ that comprise
conscious episodes. His thinking is somewhat as follows. A conscious mental state
is one the subject is aware of herself as being in. Since the best way to construe this
awareness is in terms of representation, this means some mental state of the subject
represents her to be in the relevant mental state she is aware of herself as having. For
instance, a HOT represents her to be in a red London bus-ish visual state. But, with
HOTs installed as the providers of subjective mental appearances, why should it
matter whether the target state exists? One can surely be aware of oneself as being
in a mental state even if there is no such state, as one can be aware as of a unicorn
before one without need of a unicorn. How does it feel to be aware of oneself as
instantiating a red London bus-ish percept when no such percept obtains? Conscious
mental life is the stuff of appearances, Rosenthal emphasises: thus, since the
appearance to the subject is the same whether or not she tokens a red London bus-
ish percept (providing the same HOT is in place), her experience is indistinguish-
able across both cases—as hallucinations can be indistinguishable from their
veridical counterparts. Corresponding remarks apply to misrepresentation: HOTs
govern the subjective mental appearances constitutive of the subject’s stream of
consciousness.
4. Many commentators have felt dissatisfied with this response.11 Surely, the
sentiment goes, in this higher-order representational theory of consciousness,
10 He cannot apparently deny a conscious state is produced by this combination of HOT and percept,
since by hypothesis these sorts of combination produce conscious states, and the sheer fact that the HOT
represents the sensory state creates room in principle for misrepresentation.
11 Kriegel (2009: 131) claims Rosenthal’s treatment of targetlessness violates the ‘obvious truism’ that
there’s something it’s like for a subject only if she is in a conscious mental state—recall that HOTs are
not standardly conscious, so absent also a first-order state the obvious truism seems contravened, as the
subject still enjoys the relevant subjective mental appearances. Rosenthal might reply either by denying
the truism, or accepting it but denying the conscious state the subject is in must exist. Kriegel assumes the
subject being ‘in’ the state implies it exists, but this is simply to reject the position Rosenthal takes, where
this ‘in’ has a more intentional flavour (in such cases, anyway).
Quotational higher-order thought theory 2707
123
shouldn’t the represented lower-order content matter somewhat more to the content
the subject is conscious of? Block has sought to focus these rays of dissatisfaction
into a precise objection. Suspecting Rosenthal’s approach ends up ‘jettisoning the
first-order content as constitutive of consciousness’,12 Block alleges an incoherence
in HOT theory, due to Rosenthal’s ‘holding both that an appropriate higher-order
thought is sufficient for a conscious state and that being the object of an appropriate
higher-order thought is necessary for a conscious state’.13
A targetless HOT supports a conscious state, by the sufficient condition. Yet
since it has no target, and we can imagine it is not targeted by another higher-order
thought, there exists a conscious state without anything being the object of an
appropriate HOT, violating the necessary condition. Block concludes HOT theory’s
necessary and sufficient conditions conflict, leaving it incoherent. But Rosenthal’s
theory is not vulnerable to this objection, as Rosenthal doesn’t endorse the stated
necessary condition. He is happy that lone, targetless HOTs supply the subjective
mental appearances characteristic of consciousness. Block’s necessary condition is
really only necessary for a pre-existing sensory state: its only hope of entering
consciousness is via HOT representation.14 But HOTs are ultimately responsible for
generating subjective mental appearances. So Block’s attempt to disintegrate HOT
theory fails.
Still, there’s surely something solid within the residue of dissatisfaction around
Rosenthal’s treatment of HOT mistargeting. This precipitate will by no means prove
fatal to Rosenthal’s theory, but isolating it will suggest a more fruitful higher-order
formula for consciousness.
5. Here’s a natural way to capture the naive appeal HOT theory has had for many
people as an analysis of consciousness. Consider a red London bus-ish percept, but
lodged in a blindsighter’s brain. Though she may glean much information from it,
even being able to report on the stimulus colour when prompted, something is
clearly missing for this subject; that would be even were she one of Block’s
mythical superblindsighters. What’s missing, of course, is that she is not conscious
of the red bus-ish percept: there’s nothing it’s like for her to token it. HOT theory
seems to offer a pleasingly substantive account of the extra something needed to get
the visual percept into the subject’s stream of consciousness, making her conscious
of its qualities. The answer is that the red bus-ish percept would enter her conscious
mental life just in case it became suitably represented by a HOT.
Now we’re aware, from Rosenthal’s treatment of mistargeting, that HOTs call the
shots regarding the contents of consciousness. What gets into the subject’s stream of
consciousness is all and only what her HOTs represent as being the case. Imagine
our blindsighter has an operation (currently impossible) to undo her blindsight,
making her capable (on Rosenthal’s scheme) of tokening the HOTs requisite for
visual consciousness of items presented to the hitherto blind field. Things start well:
her red London bus-ish percept is HOT-targeted, and she becomes (joy!) conscious
12 Block (2011: 447). Ultimately I deem Block’s suspicion justified—the next section explains how.
13 Block (2011: 443).
14 The same goes for HOTs: to be conscious, they require still higher-order representers.
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as of a red London bus. But then something malfunctions, and, while its
corresponding HOT continues in action, the red London bus-ish percept is
destroyed. What happens to the subject’s conscious state? Does she experience any
change? It seems clear that on Rosenthal’s theory the subject should still be
conscious red London bus-ishly: for it is HOTs and the presentations they make that
determine conscious mental life, and this HOT remains in service, dutifully
representing the presence of a red London bus-ish visual percept. So far this is only
another illustration of Rosenthal’s treatment of mistargeting. In our scenario we
have just gone from ‘veridical’ conscious experience (accurate representation of a
mental state) to a targetless case, and what he says about this latter species evidently
applies.
Here’s the problem. It’s clear that, once it has disappeared, the visual percept
makes no contribution to the stream of consciousness: the subject cannot be
conscious of the red bus-ish percept, since it no longer exists. If you’re really
conscious of x, as opposed to being conscious merely as of x, then x surely exists.
And Rosenthal’s theory—on the natural way of explicating its appeal—was
supposed to account for our consciousness of mental states,15 not merely our
consciousness as of mental states. We wanted to know what it would take to make
our blindsighter conscious of her red London bus-ish percept—what it would take
for that very visual percept to be like something for her; not merely what it would
take to give her every impression that some such percept was like something for her.
As noted, in the present case the disappearance of the visual percept need make no
difference to the subject’s conscious mental life, since the HOT keeps supplying the
relevant appearances to her stream of consciousness. The complaint, then, is not
quite that the visual percept is redundant, or is jettisoned in Rosenthal’s account of a
conscious state—it may, for all we know, be a necessary ground of that token HOT,
with its particular content, arising. The problem, rather, is that—as this case
shows—the subject simply never becomes conscious of the first-order state at all,
even in the good case.
An analogy should bring the point out. Imagine looking down on a smooth, level
sheet of blue velvet, a couple of square meters in size (supported by someone at
each corner). Held under the sheet, not yet touching it, are various moulded figures,
also coated in blue velvet. You’re unaware of the shapes. For you to form an idea
which shapes are there, it’s necessary (and sufficient) for us to press some shape up
into the sheet, wrapping a portion of the sheet around it, for you to see. Imagine
there’s a rabbit-shaped object, and it gets raised into the velvet sheet. The sheet is
wrapped around the rabbit, and you see a blue velvet rabbit shape, big ears
protruding. You now know there’s a blue rabbit–shaped figure, and even have
accurate ideas of its surface colour and texture. But for all this you don’t actually
see the rabbit. If we remove the rabbit and its impression remains (perhaps the
velvet is rather stiff), your visual experience won’t alter. But the rabbit is no longer
there, so you can’t be seeing it. Yet you are seeing just what you saw before we
removed the rabbit—namely, a rabbit-shaped portion of blue velvet. Therefore you
15 At least, where these exist.
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did not see the rabbit when the rabbit was present, pressed into the velvet layer,
either. The sheet screened the rabbit off from you.16
Corresponding remarks apply to an episode of ‘sensory consciousness’ on
Rosenthal’s theory. The fabric of a Rosenthalian HOT is simply too ‘thick’ for the
sensory target ever to penetrate to the subject’s stream of consciousness. Managing
entirely the content of one’s stream of consciousness, HOTs effectively block
anything else getting in. At best we consciously experience veridical echoes of
sensory states; but of the sensory states we are not conscious. This manifests in the
possibility that, on their removal, we are left with just the conscious impression they
made when extant, and experience no change. Experiencing no change17 means the
same appearances are contributed to the stream of consciousness as were contributed
while the relevant sensory state persisted and was HOT-targeted. But since the
appearances remain the same with the sensory state removed, the latter was
contributing no appearances to subjective mental life. It’s not as if the HOTmust now
‘pick up some slack’ in generating appearances formerly due to the sensory state.
Rather, it has been the HOT governing appearances added to the stream of
consciousness all along. In other words, we were not ever quite conscious of the
sensory state. Rosenthal sometimes approaches acknowledgment of this verdict,
averring that a sensory state ‘can contribute nothing to phenomenology apart from the
way we’re conscious of it’.18 That ‘way’, of course, is just the HOT which represents
said sensory state. Hence all a sensory state contributes to the stream of consciousness
is a proxy that represents it; otherwise put, it directly contributes nothing. It doesn’t
appear to consciousness—therefore we are not conscious of it.19
Rosenthal’s theory, while far from incoherent, lacks on examination the appeal it
appeared to possess: it doesn’t account for sensory states becoming conscious, since
we are never strictly conscious of them. There’s nothing they are like for us, given
Rosenthal’s envisaged structure for conscious states. This constitutes not a
refutation, but clarification, of Rosenthal’s theory. His concern is what supports
the stream of consciousness, and nothing said puts his theory in doubt regarding that
objective.20 Still, we’re surely within rights to seek a theory that does hold the
16 We could create a misrepresentation case by changing the shape pressed into the velvet while keeping
the rabbit impression intact—either suffices for the point, which is perhaps more vivid with a targetless-
style case. Note that velvet sheet—the supplier of appearances—and rabbit are distinct items, so this is
quite disanalogous to seeing an object by seeing its facing side.
17 N.b. it’s not that we are oblivious as to any change in the appearances, it’s that there is in fact no
change to the appearances (regardless how the subject judges).
18 Rosenthal (2004, p. 32).
19 It is decidedly not implied here that HOTs are conscious (in the sense of our being conscious of them);
though they supply appearances to the stream of consciousness, these are appearances not of themselves,
but as of sensory states.
20 As Brown (2012) notes ‘what matters, on Rosenthal’s account, is explaining the subjective
appearances…The goal is not to explain how some token state gets transformed into a conscious state, but
rather to explain the way one’s own mental life appears to one…how it is that you appear to be in some
given state at one time and don’t appear to be in it at some other time.’ Brown calls the Rosenthal-style
account ‘non-relational’, and a theory that aims to explain how we become conscious of sensory states
(not merely as of sensory states) ‘the relational view’.
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appeal we mistakenly glimpsed in Rosenthal’s theory. To adopt a term of Kriegel’s,
we might hope for genuine intimacy with our sensory states, in sensory
consciousness.
6. A sensible place to turn is to a self-representational (SR) theory, to ensure
sensory states make an appearance in the stream of consciousness. Here’s a simple
SR theory: our red London bus-ish percept, as well as representing red London bus-
ishly, represents itself. Since this mental state is the thing HO representing,
contributing thereby to the subject’s conscious mental life, and since it’s identical
with the item represented, the percept, one intuits that the mental object of mental
representation is not left out of consciousness. The bill for this intuition is paid by
observing that the sensory target cannot now go missing with conscious appearances
unperturbed. Since the conscious state uses itself to represent itself, were the target
missing the state determining the contents of consciousness would also be absent: in
short there would be no appearances to the subject, no conscious state.
Sadly, this structure for a conscious state cannot realistically obtain. Wielding
representation to analyse consciousness has multiple purposes. One is to capture the
phenomenology; another, to render the correct metaphysics of conscious states—as
with our noting self-representation seems equipped to get sensory states into the
stream of consciousness. Still a third purpose is that we have an eye on naturalism—
representation is a relation widely deemed a promising candidate for naturalisation.
If consciousness can be explained representationally, a naturalistic explanation of
consciousness seems within reach. But caution is required: not every variety of
representation is guaranteed to be naturalistically acceptable.21
Kriegel notes a problem on this score for simple SR theory. Naturalising
representation, by our best guess, means explaining it causally. Very roughly,
representations are caused by their representata.22 But clearly, a token cannot cause
itself. Simple self-representation is a reflexive relation, while causation is anti-
reflexive, so simple self-representation cannot be analysed causally. That leaves
simple SR theory naturalistically dubious, and to be rejected.23
7. Self-representation appeared a promising way to get sensory states into
consciousness (to make them like something for the subject). Simple SR theory
failed, but we, with Kriegel, shouldn’t be unduly deterred. Kriegel’s (2009) book
develops a sophisticated SR model, and it’s worthwhile to consider its adequacy.
Kriegel splits the conscious state into parts. There’s the sensory component, with
‘first-order’ environmental content—red-London-bus-ish content, say. There is also
a HO representational component, targeting the sensory component: it represents
21 Nor is every non-representational relation of HO cognitive access guaranteed to be naturalistically
unacceptable—we exploit this loophole later (§9 onwards).
22 Though varying widely in their elaboration, this problematic causal condition is the core of most
naturalistic theories of representation. A functionalist alternative is rejected in footnote 23.
23 Kriegel (2009). Gennaro (2006) presses the same difficulty. A functionalist construal of simple self-
representation, with one mental state playing a ‘first-order’ and a ‘higher-order’ role, escapes the
naturalistic concern but clashes with the need to capture phenomenology: functional properties are
dispositional, whereas sensory consciousness is occurrent; so they are non-identical properties (see
Kriegel 2009, ch. 6.2).
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there to be a sensory component which represents red London bus-ishly. That’s
what the HO component directly represents, but it also indirectly represents the
composite mental state of which it’s part. Kriegel explains indirect representation by
an example: a painting directly represents (by depicting) the front of a house, and
indirectly represents the entire house thereby. Roughly: you can indirectly represent
a whole by directly representing a part when that part is well integrated into, and
comprises a decent (or significant) portion of, said whole. A map of the UK couldn’t
be used to indirectly represent the world (despite the pretensions of certain
politicians), but a map with Germany, France and the UK highlighted probably
could be used to indirectly represent Europe. So, the HO representer, in directly
representing the sensory component, indirectly represents the entire mental state.
That mental state therefore self-represents: one of its parts represents its whole. The
HO representer being a (logical)24 part of this overall state, it indirectly represents
itself into the bargain. As before, what the representer represents feeds into the
stream of consciousness; so the subject enjoys a conscious state with red London
bus-ish content, but also peripheral awareness of the HO representer. The
representer is the awareness-supplying component, so in (indirectly) representing
itself it grants the subject peripheral awareness of awareness. Kriegel claims this
‘peripheral inner awareness’ is a salient, if elusive, aspect of all conscious
experience, and his theory garners support from explaining it.
It’s key to the distinctiveness of this account that HO representer and sensory
component really are united in a single mental state. Kriegel doesn’t want simply to
label their conjunction a mental state.25 Moreover, the account of indirect
representation relies on genuine integration of the representing part with the
indirectly represented whole (plus the requirement that the directly represented part
comprise a considerable portion of this whole).26 How, then, are HO representer and
sensory component integrated?
Kriegel distinguishes complexes from sums.27 A sum ceases to exist only when
one of its members ceases to exist. A complex ceases to exist with all its members
intact if they leave the complex-making relationship: the relationship between the
parts is essential. A friendship is a complex, since it clearly ceases to exist if the
components fall out, though they persist. Losing friends isn’t usually fatal! For the
complex of a conscious state, says Kriegel, comprising HO and sensory
24 Kriegel defines logical parthood as ‘parthood that is neither spatial nor temporal’ (2009: 218).
25 He fears (2009: 221) his theory may differ only terminologically from HOT theory if no ‘substantive’
connection can be forged between the components.
26 This is compressed: Indirect representation requires integration of the directly represented with the
indirectly represented. So far this only requires a (directly represented) sensory state to be integrated with
the entire mental state of which it’s part. But for that mental state to self-represent (Kriegel’s recipe for
consciousness) the HO representer must also be integrated with the whole. Then one part of the complex
mental state directly represents another part and indirectly represents the whole, so the mental state self-
represents. By this operation the representer also indirectly represents itself, and we get peripheral inner
awareness. Its being integrated is crucial: it represents itself by indirectly representing the whole only
because it is integrated with that whole.
27 Following Simons (1987, ch. 9).
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components, what integrates them is their phenomenological unity, underpinned by
a cognitive unity whose mechanism he speculates may be as follows:
If the brain harbored two synchronized [regarding rate and timing of neuronal
firings] representations, one in V4 representing redness and another in (say)
the dlPFC [dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex] representing increased firing rate in
V4, at the personal level we would experience ourselves to have a single
representation that folds within it both an awareness of red and an awareness
of that awareness. (2009: 246)
Qua complex, it’s crucial to the identity and existence of the conscious state that the
two components be thus integrated; if they existed without integration, this wouldn’t
be the conscious state it is, and plausibly wouldn’t exist at all—so Kriegel
maintains. At this stage it seems HO representer and sensory component do form a
complex, and everything looks in order with Kriegel’s account.
8. But this appearance is deceptive. Kriegel’s SR structure faces no naturalistic
challenge, as it has parts to be causally related. But it can no longer, where simple
SR could, surpass HOT theory in making the subject conscious of her sensory
state—I now argue. This problem accompanies realisation that Kriegel’s two
components of a conscious state are not a complex, despite first impressions. The
gist of the argument below is this: for Kriegel mental indirect self-representation
suffices for consciousness (awareness of awareness, etc). But indirect self-
representation doesn’t require complexhood. So Kriegel’s theory of consciousness
is compatible with conscious states failing to be complexes. And if they aren’t
complexes, we will again find sensory states screened off.
We can approach the difficulty via what Kriegel says about the possibility of
mistargeting. Since there are parts to the Kriegelian conscious state, we can ask
what happens when they’re at variance.
Kriegel is explicit about cases where the representer misrepresents the sensory
state’s content: ‘inner awareness is a constituting representation: the qualitative
character of a conscious experience is constituted by the…properties it is
represented to have’.28 So, given a red London bus-ish percept, the subject
experiences red London bus-ishly just in case the HO component represents a red
London bus-ish percept (represents itself indirectly, etc.). The subjective awareness-
generating HO component generates also the qualities of which the subject is aware.
Hence misrepresentation poses no problem: what the HO representer says, goes,
effectively: ‘It is perfectly coherent to suppose that a mental state may represent
itself to be a certain way when in reality it is not that way’,29 Kriegel reasons.
This might worryingly recall Rosenthal’s treatment of mistargeting. Things grow
more worrisome when we broach the possibility of targetlessness. Kriegel’s book
presentation enjoys the fortunate (or canny!) feature that as he discusses
mistargeting early on, the reader cannot know that the SR account later endorsed
envisages conscious states as having parts: during the early discussion one can be
28 Kriegel (2009: 137).
29 Kriegel (2009: 136).
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forgiven the impression that Kriegel advocates simple SR theory. Accordingly,
when he writes ‘it is incoherent to suppose that a mental state may represent itself to
exist when in reality it does not exist…Thus a targetless self-representation is
logically impossible.’30 the reader experiences the warm glow of a problem neatly
solved: Kriegel’s theory appears invulnerable to the targetlessness alleged (by him,
among others) to threaten HOT theory. But now we know there are parts to
Kriegel’s SR conscious state. And, surely, one part might conceivably exist without
the other. What if a SR conscious state arises, comprising red London bus-ish
percept and HO component representing there to be such a percept (indirectly
representing itself, etc.), but subsequently the sensory state ceases to exist?
We may take our answer from Kriegel’s treatment of a case where a conscious
state lacks first-order qualities, but represents itself to have such properties (F):
This may be taken to constitute a serious embarrassment for self-represen-
tationalism. However, I do not see that it is…self-representationalism turns in
a verdict that is clear and unproblematic…that [the conscious state] is
qualitatively F. (2009: 137)
That’s because the HO representer’s ascription of qualitative properties to the
sensory state constitutes such properties figuring in the stream of consciousness. So
the first-order qualitative properties are not needed. Transposing this to the case of a
kosher conscious state that then loses its sensory component: Kriegel should find
this no embarrassment either—while the HO representer persists, representing there
to be a sensory component with such-and-such qualities, just those qualities must
feature in the subject’s conscious mental life.
Kriegel might block this ominous result if his claim that a conscious SR state is
complex can be sustained. Complexhood might be seen to add a condition to
sumhood: not only must the parts of the complex exist, but they must be in the
relevant relationship. So if Kriegel’s SR states are complexes, targetlessness can
plausibly be ruled out: The defence would be that a targetless HO state isn’t
conscious, as consciousness requires indirect self-representation, which requires
sensory and HO components existing in a complex.
But it can be seen that indirect self-representation does not demand complex-
hood. A complex fails if the members persist while their relationship dissolves. The
following (counterfactual) case shows the possibility of indirect self-representation
given parts no longer united in a whole. Imagine an Apple employee graphically
representing the company in a presentation by displaying a picture of Steve Jobs
(while Jobs lived), ignorant that Jobs had recently defected to Microsoft. It seems
this employee succeeds in indirectly representing Apple by representing Jobs, and in
indirectly representing herself qua (fully-integrated) Apple employee. Here indirect
self-representation is enabled by the representing part’s integration with the whole
indirectly represented, but that whole is indirectly represented through direct
representation of a formerly integrated component. Jobs-at-Apple was never a
complex, since the company would have survived Jobs’ quitting. So indirect self-
30 (2009: 136).
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representation does not require complexhood. Perhaps it requires there to have
existed a good level of integration between directly represented component and
whole (and for the directly represented part to be significant to the whole), but it
doesn’t demand the ongoing existence of that relationship.31 It follows that Kriegel
cannot claim consciousness implies complexhood, since consciousness-supporting
indirect self-representation does not demand complexhood. Nor does it even
demand the persistence of the component whose representation grounds indirect
representation of the whole: actually we routinely indirectly represent Apple by
representing Steve Jobs, although Jobs has died.32
Back to our case: the HO representer can still indirectly represent itself by
representing the sensory state with which it was formerly integrated. The HO
component is well integrated into the mental state thereby represented, as that state
now consists just of itself. We have, overall: first, a HO representer that indirectly
represents itself, so there should be peripheral awareness of awareness; second, a
mental state with a component representing that mental state, i.e. a self-
representing—so conscious—mental state; and finally, as before, the HO representer
constitutively represents red London bus-ish sensory qualities. All the ingredients
seem in place for a Kriegel-style SR conscious state, given the lone HO representer.
Kriegel cannot block targetlessness. The (alleged) phenomenological—felt—‘unity’
of awareness of awareness with sensory content doesn’t guarantee an existent first-
order state, or complexity in the vehicle of this content.
Kriegel defends his claim that conscious states are complexes: ‘When I have a
perceptual experience of the blue sky, the perception of blue and the awareness
of that perception are unified by some psychologically real relation whose
dissolution would entail the destruction of the experience’.33 But, given Kriegel’s
constitutive HO representing of experienced qualities, we have unmasked that
relation as constitution: the conscious state is exhausted by the HO (self)rep-
resenter. The sensory state, even when existent, enters no complex with the HO
component.
In our targetless case it’s the constitutive representing of red London bus-ish
qualities (as ascribed to the sensory component) that sees them enter the subject’s
stream of consciousness. Now the sensory component is gone, such representation
persists. The qualities that now figure in consciousness are the same, and their
31 Kriegel’s painting of a house doesn’t self-represent, but plausibly all that’s needed is for the painting
to be inside the house it depicts. But painting and house are not a complex—no entity is destroyed if the
painting is removed. Moreover, if the house burns down, but the painting survives, the painting can still
indirectly self-represent by representing its old home.
32 A trickier case is where the HO representer represents a non-existent sensory component (one never
integrated with it). Yet if the HO component is ‘none the wiser’ about the non-existence of its intentional
object, and this represented object is putatively integrated with it in the way an existent sensory
component would be, plausibly it could still indirectly self-represent. Maybe this case is far-fetched, but it
might illustrate the possibility: if someone believed Atlantis (assuming Atlantis never existed) was a large
component of the European landmass, they could plausibly indirectly represent Europe by representing
Atlantis. If that’s right, Kriegel’s ‘integration’ requirement on indirect representing has a somewhat
intentional flavour.
33 Kriegel (2009: 222).
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source is the same; namely, the aforementioned constitutive HO representation.34
Therefore, by parallel with the reasoning applied to Rosenthal’s theory, the subject
is not conscious of the sensory state’s qualities even in the good case. Kriegel’s HO
representers screen the sensory state off from consciousness just like their
Rosenthalian predecessors.
Kriegel implicitly acknowledges this result. Even where a sensory component is
present and correct, its ‘[first-order qualitative] properties are not part of the
experience’s phenomenal character, indeed are not phenomenologically manifest in
any way’,35 he says. Kriegel’s account, by following Rosenthal’s theory in its
division of labour between percepts and their HO representations as regards
supplying the appearances characteristic of consciousness, forgoes complexity, and
fails to deliver on its promise to make us conscious of our sensory states.36
Recall our blindsighter who has blindsight-reversing surgery. Considering the
before-and-after contrast in this subject’s mental life, who, post-operation, is conscious
of the red London bus-ish qualities that lay unexperienced in her visual cortex, we
hoped for a theory that would explain what it took to get these qualities—just these
qualities—into her stream of consciousness. Rosenthal’s HOT theory and Kriegel’s SR
theory cannot satisfy this reasonable hope. These accounts construe conscious states in
non-relational terms, with HO representers doing all the ‘phenomenal labour’. Hence
the variety of HO theories of consciousness is only superficial. But it’s not asking too
much for a HO theory to satisfy our hope, and it could well be expected to construe
consciousness-supporting states as complexes. Such a theory follows.
9. Kriegel introduces the notion of a ‘display sentence’, via the example of a
bridge with ‘under construction’ painted on it.37 Crossing, you think ‘This bridge is
under construction’. Kriegel suggests what you actually have before you is the
complete sentence ‘This bridge is under construction’, with the subject term
supplied by the bridge. The bridge is present in the sentence, allowing the sentence
overall to say something about it. Generally, a display sentence features a
constituent whose semantic role is to contribute itself. Searle notes that usually our
conversational topic is not within reach, so we use a symbol to stand for—
represent—it. When the topic is in our vicinity, however, the possibility arises of
embedding it within our discourse. In such cases the term pertaining to the item in
question does not represent it, but, being just the item itself, simply presents it.38
34 One might fear we now have a simple SR state, with accompanying worries about naturalisation. But
as Kriegel argues, indirect representation is plausibly non-causal, so there’s no problem with it being
reflexive. Kriegel has perhaps rescued simple SR theory! The notion of a non-causal, but naturalistically
acceptable, grounding for mental intentionality will matter later.
35 (2009: 110).
36 Weisberg (2008) notes HOT theory and SR theory agree in having HO representation constitute
experienced qualities. He infers SR theory has no advantage regarding intimacy with first-order qualities.
But, as he endorses HOT theory, he cannot see this—as I do—as reason to look past both views, for one
that would make us genuinely conscious of sensory states.
37 Kriegel (2009) derives the term ‘display sentence’ from Zemach (1985), who attributes the idea to
Searle (1969).
38 Searle (1969). Kriegel prefers a representational reading of display, but I side with Searle, as explained
below.
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Kriegel doesn’t note, but it is relevant to us, that the bridge only acquires this
presentational role when ‘embedded’ in the sentence. The bridge doesn’t, standing
alone, both exist as itself and present itself. That’s a function of the context supplied
by the semantic apparatus of the sentence wherein it features: within the sentence, it
is used to present itself.
Kriegel’s infectiously over-excited instinct is that display sentences are the key to
understanding consciousness, since ‘there is something special and unusual going
on…which might help us feel a ‘‘quantum leap’’ to something that might indeed be
sufficient for [consciousness]’39 Kriegel’s proposal is to model conscious states as
display sentences of a sort. But whereas he considers that the best way to do this is
via his SR theory, I offer a different way of constructing ‘mental display sentences’
that doesn’t screen off first-order sensory states. This way has certain other virtues:
notably, it deals neatly with mistargeting, and does much to satisfy our sense that we
are in some direct manner ‘acquainted’ with sensory qualities in consciousness, but
without forfeiting naturalism.
The guiding idea is that sensory states are constituents of the relevant
consciousness-supporting states, and serve to display themselves within those
constructions.40 This recalls a popular theory of the structure of phenomenal
concepts; that they ‘quote’ the experiences they refer to.41 In Balog’s words:
The idea of an item partly constituting a representation that refers to that item
is reminiscent of how linguistic quotation works. The referent of ‘‘__’’ is
exemplified by whatever fills in the blank. In a quotation expression, a token
of the referent is literally a constituent of the expression that refers to a type
which it exemplifies and that expression has its reference (at least partly) in
virtue of being so constituted. So, for example, ‘‘‘‘dog’’’’ refers to the word
spelled d-o-g, a token of which is enclosed between the quotation marks.
Although in English we normally quote only expressions of English we can
also quote foreign language representations and non-linguistic representations.
We can even imagine, perhaps just as a joke, placing something which is not a
representation, e.g., a cat, between quotes and thus produce a representation
that everyone can understand refers to the type cat. My proposal is that there is
a concept forming mechanism that operates on an experience and turns it into
a phenomenal concept that refers to either the token experience, or to a type of
phenomenal experience that the token exemplifies.42
I suggest the right higher-order analysis of consciousness sees a HO state ‘quote’ a
sensory state, forming a larger composite structure wherein the sensory state is
displayed. Its being embedded within the HO state and thereby displayed is what
39 Kriegel (2009: 164).
40 Zemach (1985: 196) says a displayed item ‘is its [own] sense’ in the display sentence. When the item
is a sensory state, this idea helps tip us further towards Kriegel’s feeling of ‘specialness’, which may just
give the display sentence structure the wherewithal to capture consciousness.
41 Papineau (2002) proposed the quotational account of phenomenal concepts. Papineau (2007) revised it
significantly.
42 Balog (2012: 33).
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constitutes the subject’s awareness of the sensory state. In contrast to the Papineau/
Balog model for phenomenal concepts, the quoted elements are not yet
experiences—for we’re explaining what turns sensory states into experiences. The
suggestion is that it is mental quotation, so this is ‘quotational higher-order
thought’—QHOT—theory. When a sensory state is quoted in the requisite way, the
result is a mental display sentence, which provides a conscious state, on the
analysis.43 Another difference is that the subject matter of QHOT theory are tokens:
the question is what makes one conscious of a token sensory state. Balog’s theory is
primarily concerned with types of (experienced) sensory states: typically we think
about experience types (‘Ow—pain again’), but we only experience sensory tokens.
For Balog token experiences are recruited to represent experience types in thoughts
about them. In QHOT theory sensory state tokens are recruited for display in HO
quotational structures that supply consciousness of said token sensory content.44
The final difference is that QHOT theory’s quotational structures are non-
representational: there is no need to represent a token sensory state which is
actually present; a type of course cannot be wholly present within a thought, so must
be referred to by use of an exemplifying token. More on this feature below (§13).
The quotational higher-order thoughts that supply consciousness are envisaged as
very thin, best modelled as demonstrating ‘frames’, with a ‘slot’ for the sensory
state. I propose the required sort of HOT has the frame-like structure ‘This state is
present: ‘‘———’’’, with the gap between the ‘‘———’’ for the embedding of a
sensory state. Let’s insert our red London bus-ish percept to yield a complete
instance of the state structure:
‘This state is present: ‘‘red London bus-ish visual quality’’’
The thesis is that a subject is conscious of this token red London bus-ish percept
just in case she enters such a state.
10. A consciousness-supporting state on QHOT theory is complex. Conscious
states comprise sensory content plus subjective awareness of that content. QHOTs,
being mere frames, determine no first-order sensory content themselves, all they can
do is display the sensory states they embed; a conscious state’s sensory content,
then, is wholly supplied by the quoted sensory state. In contrast with Kriegel and
Rosenthal’s non-relational theories, a lone HO state cannot support an experience,
since it proffers no sensory content—it simply lacks the resources (more on this
below). And without the quotational frame, a sensory state is not displayed, so by
hypothesis fails to be the object of awareness. Kriegel’s test of a complex is that its
components can persist without the complex existing, if they leave the relevant
relationship. There is nothing to prevent a given QHOT and sensory state existing
separately. But a conscious state—comprising awareness and sensory content—only
arises when the sensory state is embedded by the QHOT. Each component supplies
43 What is proposed is thus similar to Balog’s ‘joke’: placing a non-representation within the QHOT’s
quotational structure (except sensory states are also representations: they represent environmental
features).
44 Zemach sees a use for display sentences to account for thoughts about experiences (e.g. pains, 1985:
196), but it doesn’t occur to him that consciousness might be implemented by their means.
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a necessary element the other lacks. Therefore the embedding relationship between
QHOT and sensory state is essential to a conscious state, and they form a complex.
A distinction is needed to fully understand the previous paragraph. Kriegel and
Gennaro both claim the conscious state is complex. But what is conscious—what is
like something for the subject—is a content, and the content of consciousness does
not feel complex, in the relevant sense. A conscious state does not feel like the
relating of two components such that if the relation between them fails the overall
state is forfeit. Even if we discern elements in phenomenology, even if Kriegel is
right that one of these elements is awareness of awareness, phenomenological unity
and holism are paramount (something Kriegel himself stresses). What is complex,
if something must be complex, is the consciousness-supporting state: the
vehicle(s) of the conscious content. So the claim about QHOT theory is that the
quotational relation between QHOT and sensory state makes them into a complex
state, and this complexity is essential to that vehicle supporting a conscious
content. Problematically, ‘the conscious state’ is used in the literature sometimes
for vehicles and sometimes for contents. With this distinction made, we should
recall that Kriegel isn’t entitled to claim his consciousness-supporting states are
complex, since lone HO self-representers suffice for whatever ‘complexity’ is felt
in phenomenology.
This is also a good point to address Gennaro’s theory. In earlier work he seems to
offer a constitutive HO theory, which would include the unwelcome screening-off
artefact of Rosenthal and Kriegel.45 Recently, he has sought to entwine first-order
(FO) states more closely with consciousness, such that without one there is no
conscious state (CMS). He reasons:
If we have a [HOT] but no [FO] at all (or vice versa), then what would be the
entire conscious state does not exist and thus cannot be conscious. A CMS will
exist only when its two parts exist and the proper relation holds between
them.46
But this—effectively the claim that a conscious state is a complex of HOT with FO
state (the relationship concerns how the HOT conceptualises the FO state)—relies
on the ambiguity just highlighted in ‘a conscious state’. Gennaro really means that
the vehicle that suffices for there to be something it’s like for the subject is complex.
A conscious state does not feel complex, in the relevant sense, so this cannot be a
claim about content. Anyway Gennaro’s HOTs are unconscious, so there can’t be a
phenomenology of their being necessarily integrated with FO states in conscious-
ness.47 Another indication is his claim that the unconscious HOT is ‘part of’ the
conscious state. This clearly cannot be meant in a content-related sense—since an
unconscious content is not a conscious content nor part of one. Hence Gennaro is
talking at the vehicular level. So we should ask what supports the claim that the
45 Constitutive HO representation is strongly suggested when he says ‘it is the HOTs which bring the
intrinsic qualitative properties into the conscious state…When a pain or perception becomes conscious by
virtue of becoming the target of an appropriate HOT, it [only] then becomes a qualitative state’ (2004: 61).
46 Gennaro (2012: 61).
47 As against his argument (2012: 57) that consciousness is ‘intrinsic’ to a conscious state.
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vehicle for an instance of what-it-is-likeness must be complex. Why wouldn’t a lone
HOT representing an absent FO state suffice for an instance of what-it-is-likeness
indistinguishable from a case where the represented FO state exists?
Gennaro believes self-reference is involved in consciousness—his HOTs, by
representing FO states with which they are suitably related, allow the complex state
to self-represent. The main difference with Kriegel here is that Gennaro’s HOTs
don’t thereby self-represent, so there isn’t awareness of awareness—his HOTs
remain unconscious (unless introspected). So, in answer to the question above, we
can see why Gennaro would say: ‘A CMS cannot represent itself (or part of itself) if
it doesn’t exist in the first place’.48 But it’s clear he is again using ‘conscious state’
in the vehicular sense. If we suppose a conscious state is complex vehicle-wise, then
it cannot self-represent with one part missing as it would not, qua complex, exist.
But this doesn’t answer the content-level question. Would a lone HOT provide
what-it-is-likeness? We know Gennaro thinks self-representation matters, but, as
argued in connection with Kriegel, naturalistically acceptable self-representation is
possible for a single state. So self-representationalism won’t support Gennaro’s
claim that a conscious mental state is complex, i.e. that the FO state must exist.
Gennaro does not provide good grounds for his thesis that HOT and FO state must
both exist for consciousness.
Elsewhere in his theory we find cause to think FO states are surplus to the
requirements of subjective mental appearances. His model of introspection sees a
third-order HOT target a second-order HOT. But Gennaro allows that this
sometimes occurs without a FO state, as in ‘dental fear’, where patient expectations
generate something like an experience of pain. Gennaro holds that, absent a FO pain
state, patients ‘still subjectively experience those states in an indistinguishable
way’,49 i.e. indistinguishably from a genuine pain. This treatment is puzzling. Here
a subjective mental appearance as of pain is generated without any FO pain state.
One may then reasonably ask why, if two HOTs without a FO state suffice for an
experience as of pain, introspectively, one HOT with similar content won’t suffice
for a non-introspective pain-ish experience. Gennaro may point to the presence of
an existent conscious state in introspection: the introspected HOT. But in normal
experience a HOT doesn’t need to be conscious for its content—e.g. that there’s
pain—to mould subjective mental appearances, so it’s unclear why this difference
would make the difference. Again, the introspected HOT is mistaken for a pain, due
to the representational error of the introspective HOT. But this HOT is unconscious,
so we still find that unconscious HOTs can single-handedly fix mental appearances.
Given this approach to introspection, it’s hard to see what grounds Gennaro could
offer for saying a lone pain-representing HOT wouldn’t suffice for a pain-ish
experience.
From other things he says there would be considerable pressure on him to openly
put HOTs in sole command of subjective mental appearances. He holds that
experienced content is wholly fixed by concepts in the HOT (hence the experiences
48 Gennaro (2012: 63).
49 Gennaro (2012: 69). See pp. 96–7 for a case involving emotions.
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of trained wine-tasters) and still maintains that without a HOT sensory states lack
qualitative character.50 Overall Gennaro’s theory is unstable, and its strongest
elements will likely push him into a view with constitutive HO representing,
screening-off FO states, like Rosenthal and Kriegel.
The trick to turn with a HO theory of consciousness is that matters content-wise,
what’s experienced, must be explained by matters vehicular, not the other way
around. If one finds oneself adding conditions to the vehicular relationship just to
preserve some content feature—e.g. to involve FO sensory contents in conscious-
ness—then one is into the realm of the ad hoc move. There’s nothing in the nature
of his vehicles that requires content match between Gennaro’s FO and HO states—
this emendation exists solely to cater for a content-feature Gennaro desires. The
exemplar is simple SR theory: here it couldn’t be clearer how content depends on
vehicle; no HO or FO vehicle, no consciousness, on the assumption that HO
representation enables consciousness, since loss of either vehicle means no vehicle
at all, hence no HO representation. Gennaro and Kriegel both wish to retain the
services of FO states, but their vehicular setup does not allow this in a principled
way. Rosenthal has the virtue of not worrying about the relevance of FO states. If
we must reject simple SR theory, we are left with one theory where the relevance of
FO states follows from the vehicular setup: QHOT theory, where complexity
derives from the nature of the vehicles.
11. Through those features that deliver complexhood, QHOT theory offers a
satisfying treatment of mistargeting, without ‘screening off’ sensory contents like
previous accounts. It’s clear, first, that misrepresentation cannot occur. A QHOT
determines no sensory content: all the sensory content of a conscious state is
supplied by the quoted sensory state. If I want quotationally to represent what
Florence said yesterday in the heat of argument I can say ‘She said this: ‘‘Get out
and never come back’’’. A little closer to our model, I can play a tape-recording of
what she said (was I sufficiently self-possessed to make one), saying ‘She said this:
*click*’, i.e. playing the tape-recording at the relevant point. Closer still, I could
summon her to repeat what she said, saying ‘She said this: ‘‘———’’’, and letting
her fire. I’m not yet employing her very utterance, though, so we can imagine one
further—outlandish—case. Had we a time machine, we could return to the instant
Florence was about to shout at me, and I could say (looking on at my wretched past
self): ‘She said this ‘‘ ———’’’, indicating the utterance. Now, with this way of
quoting what Florence said—note it is no longer represented, but exhibited—it’s
impossible for me to stray from what she said, since her very utterance is used by
me to present itself. Likewise, it’s impossible for a QHOT to misconstrue the
sensory state of which it supplies awareness. For what supplies the sensory content
of the quotational conscious state is just that very sensory state itself, with its
content. This result is achieved by the removal the dual layer of sensory contents
featured in SR and HOT theories.51
50 Gennaro (2012: 65).
51 Block (2011) notes that what ails HOT theory is deploying two layers of qualitative content.
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What of targetlessness? A lone QHOT won’t suffice for a conscious state. Here’s
why. QHOTs are hypothesised to supply subjective awareness. However, if a QHOT
has no sensory target to embed, it could at most arouse subjective awareness of (a
state of) nothing, since it altogether lacks first-order content. But subjective
awareness of a state of nothing at all just isn’t subjective awareness, since subjective
awareness must be (intentionally) of something. An experience literally of nothing is
simply no experience. Therefore an empty QHOT won’t produce subjective
awareness—or a conscious state.52 QHOTs can only make the subject aware of
something if there is something (sensory content) to be aware of. ‘This state is
present: ‘‘*blank*’’’ fails to be a thought.53 Similarly, a linguistic quotational frame
without any entrapped token doesn’t quote, and fails to be a sentence. QHOT theory
claims that consciousness is mental quotation.
The theory thus deals neatly with the mistargeting cases that, on a plausible
reconstruction, largely motivate Kriegel and Rosenthal’s move to ‘insulate’ first-
order states from consciousness, putting HO representers in charge of the subjective
mental appearances characteristic of phenomenality. QHOT theory manages this
without screening off sensory states. Since such states get into the very fabric of the
structures that constitute awareness of them, since they are displayed in those
structures simply by being embedded, when we are conscious of a sensory content
it’s the very first-order sensory state with this content of which we are aware.54, 55
12. The last sentence evokes acquaintance, a relation of intimacy to sensory
qualities many have felt we enjoy, but which seems naturalistically unpalatable,
52 Some meditators claim to achieve a conscious state of ‘nothingness’. But, without doubting the
veracity, we can challenge this description of their reports. The meditative state likely features an
exceptionally general, diffuse, sense of oneself, or the universe at large, but were it really an experience of
nothing we should declare it no experience.
53 Hallucinations purport to make us aware of nonexistent external things. But there still exists a sensory
content, as of an (in fact nonexistent) external item. In our case, we are imagining there is no such sensory
content, either. In that case a QHOT cannot make us aware of anything, therefore it cannot make us
aware, full-stop, since awareness is always (intentionally) of something.
54 By dealing with mistargeting while keeping first-order contents as constitutive of consciousness,
QHOT theory sidesteps Brown’s (2012) argument from mistargeting against the relational view, and for
the non-relational view.
55 Van Gulick’s higher-order global space (HOGS) theory (2000, 2004) envisages a sensory state as
‘embedded’ within a HO state that represents it (Van Gulick holds sensory states are ‘recruited’ by global
brain states, which implicitly represent them). He can thus plausibly offer a similar treatment of
mistargeting (e.g., in a targetless case he might claim there is a ‘hole’ in the global state where sensory
quality should be, meaning no sensory consciousness). However he doesn’t avail himself of a quotational
model, and retains representation. He also holds that HO representers ‘transform’ the sensory state’s
content, that making it conscious ‘require[s] some change in the state itself rather than just making it the
object of a higher-order thought or perception’ (2000: §3). I deny quotational embedding alters the
sensory state. Once the HO component gets involved in determining experienced sensory content, we risk
losing contact with the first-order state again in favour of constitutive HO representing. In this case Van
Gulick’s theory would lapse into the undesirable situation of the other theories. What these accounts share
is two levels of qualitative content (cf. Block 2011; Brown 2012), one of which inevitably conflicts with
the other, and representation, which creates distance from one’s subject-matter. QHOT theory has one
level of sensory content, and no representation, so avoids this difficulty. If Van Gulick relinquished the
‘two content’ model, and constitutive HO representing, QHOT theory might be viewed as a way of
developing the HOGS model.
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because unanalysable. Kriegel favours his SR account of consciousness over an
acquaintance-based account precisely because representation appears naturalisable.
Still, he admits the appeal of the idea that we’re intimate with our conscious sensory
states, so we cannot be mistaken in consciousness about their qualities, and in the
sense that ‘there is not a gap…between the awareness and what one is aware of’.56
His way of achieving this last result is, we’ve seen, to make HO representing
constitutive of experienced qualities, screening off first-order sensory states from
consciousness. The intimacy Kriegel supplies, then, is not the sort we hoped for: we
are intimate with the wrong thing, on his theory.
There’s little worrying for the naturalist in the idea of quotational display; else
physicalism would be under threat from Shakespeare seminars, and Balog—a
hardened physicalist—wouldn’t appeal to quotation to model phenomenal concepts.
But, intuitively, mental quotation would make us intimate with first-order qualities:
there’d be no gap between awareness and what we are aware of, since sensory
qualities would themselves be displayed within the quotational conscious state. So
QHOT theory captures what’s desirable in the idea that we are acquainted with our
qualia, yet avoids the screening-off artefact of other accounts, and remains
naturalistically respectable. Quotational display is that tantalising tad more intimate
than representation, without being naturalistically worrisome like acquaintance. To
be clear: quotational display is not acquaintance, in the sense of an irreducible
epistemic relation to conscious contents. Quotational display is analysable as the
embedding of a sensory state in a QHOT—the key semantic mechanism is
constitution. More on this mechanism in the next section.
13. I now address some objections, aiming to clarify and defend QHOT theory.
i. So a sensory state appears as such within the QHOT, but why couldn’t its content
be ‘distorted’, yielding something like misrepresentation?
Since we’re talking about quotational sampling, any inaccuracy would have to
derive from something outside the quoted item. But then it could not, it seems,
tamper with the latter’s intrinsic content. Perhaps I could frame Florence’s utterance
thus ‘She did not say this: ‘‘——’’’ in the time-travel scenario. Clearly, though,
since the quoted item is present by hypothesis, this frame does nothing to distort it.
But what if a nefarious QHOT arose with content like ‘The qualitative opposite of
this state is here: ‘‘—’’’, directed, say, upon a red percept? Would one see green?
Either this QHOT supplies a conscious state, or not. No difficulty arises in the latter
case. In the former, recall that a QHOT contributes no first-order content (sheer
quotation, a higher-order operation, cannot amend the quoted) so if the subject is
made conscious at all it can only be of the embedded, red, sensory content. So it
seems first-order sensory content cannot be misportrayed in consciousness—even
for nefarious QHOTs, first-order inaccuracy is impossible. Perhaps the most that
could happen is that the subject acquires an erroneous (and, if conscious,
discomfiting) belief that what is an occurrent conscious state is distorted in
consciousness. Analogously, a sign saying ‘The geographical opposite of this is
56 Kriegel (2009: 109).
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here’, pointing to a large chasm, can do nothing but make the observer aware of the
chasm; it cannot make her see a mountain.
ii. Still, quotation doesn’t preclude targetlessness: I can point at Beyonce´ and report
(lying) ‘She said this ‘‘I’m so into you’’’. So it isn’t the quotational element of
QHOT theory that deals with targetlessness, but a stipulation that the quoted item
be present. But this is as ad hoc (or not) as Gennaro’s matching requirement,
criticised earlier.
Normally when quoting we must employ representations of the subject-matter, as
we are unable to display it (even on Balog’s theory phenomenal concepts typically
use a token of an experience type to stand for another such token, or for the type).
This opens the door, of course, for distortion (misquoting), even targetlessness (as in
lying), since we are at representational distance from the target.57 But the primary
notion in QHOT theory is the display sentence, and the variety of quotation
involved is peculiar in being display-based: the very subject-matter is present in the
quotational construction. It’s this variety of quotation which blocks targetlessness,
in a principled way. An absent target cannot be displayed, and without display there
is—by hypothesis—no consciousness.
iii. If QHOT theory precludes error about our conscious states it’s an implausible
theory, since we evidently make such errors.
QHOT theory implies we cannot be mistaken in consciousness about which sensory
state is present—it cannot be we are conscious as of a red quale when what’s
instantiated (in that precise ‘location’) is a blue quale. The QHOT structure indeed
leaves no room for this. But it has long been felt that experience is invulnerable to
such error: that no appearance/reality gap obtains for consciousness. QHOT theory
promises to vindicate this traditionally troublesome intuition in a naturalistically
acceptable form. Notably, HOT and SR theories also achieve this result, in their
way—they agree appearance and reality coincide for consciousness—albeit at the
cost of constitutive, thus insulating, HO representing. So denying an appearance/
reality distinction for consciousness, if it comprises an objection, does not single
QHOT theory out. QHOT theory has the added benefit of guaranteeing first-order
accuracy. But why would that provide an objection to the theory? For other theories
the problem would be that the relationship between HO and FO state is
representational, and representation—if naturalistic—entails possible misrepresen-
tation. But QHOT theory is non-representational, so this inference does not apply.
As we will see below, there is nothing non-naturalistic about QHOT theory’s
posited mode of higher-order cognitive access, yet this mode ensures FO accuracy.
However, QHOT theory doesn’t remove the possibility of error about conscious
states—for as soon as we represent these, in thought, we presumably move away
from a display structure. And now misclassification and misrepresentation become
distinct possibilities—and actualities. Though feeling the cold of the dentist’s
needle, one may well, in expectation of pain, momentarily misclassify the sensation
57 Cf. Levine (2001: 108).
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and react by the classification rather than what’s felt. Likewise introspection, if it
employs representation, suffers such defects. QHOT theory has no trouble
permitting these phenomena. In fact, it explains why there is no appearance/reality
gap for consciousness, but a healthy one for thought about consciousness: the
former, but not the latter, uses a display-based structure.58
iv. What is mental quoting, anyway? We understand how linguistic quotation works,
but that relies on shared conventions, which can’t be operating in the context of
making a mental state a conscious state.
In fact there is surprisingly little agreement about how linguistic quotation operates,
though we seem to recognise and understand it when we meet it.59 So the objection
cannot be that linguistic quoting is well understood but mental quotation wholly
obscure. Departing from certain elements discussed in connection with linguistic
quotation, we can sketch a mental model and its required features. First is a question
of reference. In linguistic quotation, a token word is entrapped usually to pronounce
about its type—as in ‘’’Socrates’’ has eight letters’. Where we quote one thing to say
something about another—a token is non-identical with its type—then of course
refer-ence must occur, the token actually present is utilised to speak of another,
related, item. With QHOTs, however, a token sensory state is not entrapped to make
comment on some other entity, not even its qualitative type. Instead, the QHOT’s
semantic duties begin and end with that token, which is actually present, embedded
in the QHOT (I discuss the embedding below). Accordingly, it has been maintained
that the entrapped token plays no referential role in linguistic token quotation.
Rather than referring to anything, it is simply present in, and presented by, the
quotational frame. This seems the sort of thing we should say about the sensory
states in QHOTs. Since the sensory token is not used to refer to anything (even
itself) there is no need of quasi-linguistic conventions to settle reference. The
sensory token is just presented. Once we move outside the head we are typically
dealing with one thing standing for another, signs. Signs are arbitrary, since they
(usually) do not contain what is spoken about, so conventions become needed.
When a token is being presented no convention is needed to relate it to itself,
referentially or otherwise. It is simply there and displayed.
58 A wrinkle: On Balog’s model a phenomenal concept can be used to think about an occurrent token
experience. If that token is, as on QHOT theory, a displayed token sensory state it might seem the
quotational ascent that takes us to the phenomenal concept leaves no room for distortion: there would then
be, perhaps implausibly, an error-free variety of thought about experiences. Some won’t find this
implausible—while a theory must allow error in thought about experiences, that doesn’t mean it can’t
compass also an error-free kind. However, this consequence may be avoidable: Balog suggests (see
earlier quote) that reference to a token experience goes first via the type it exemplifies—one uses the
token to refer to the type, and in falling under this type one thinks again of the token. This long,
referential, chain affords ample opportunity for error, e.g. if the token changes while thought is ‘on its
way back’ to it. Alternatively, one may reject the quotational phenomenal concept model of introspection,
as I do.
59 See e.g. Davidson (1979), Washington (1992), Searle (1969), for recent theories and Capellen and
Lepore (2012) for a wider survey. The model we are closest to is undoubtedly Searle’s.
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There is another potential source of conventionality: linguistic quotation works
through quotation marks, and only by convention do they have their function
regarding the entrapped token. It’s worth noting here too, however, that some
schools of thought deny quotation marks refer to the entrapped token. It has been
claimed that they simply demonstrate or present it (n.b.: this isn’t the same as saying
they are a demonstrative device, a referring expression60). 61 This, too, is the sort of
thing we should say about QHOTs. Again, it may be alleged that even if they don’t
strictly refer to it, still it is only by convention that quotation marks have their
function of demonstrating or displaying the entrapped. In response we may note, a
point common in the quotation literature, that quotation doesn’t need quotation
marks—italics do equally well, and there are many other devices, actual and
possible. In speech emphasis indicates a quoted word. This suggests it’s the way the
entrapped token is used that determines whether it is quoted. All our various marks
do is make the reader aware she is entering a quotational context; but that the
context is quotational is not actually a matter of convention. It may be a matter
instead of author intentions: but that shows a quotational context is not an
essentially conventional entity, but one determined by the user of the entrapped
token. Correspondingly, in the mental case we would hypothesise the existence of a
kind of sub-personal mental state that can use sensory states in this sort of way—for
display—as an intrinsic matter, i.e. as a feature of the cognitive system. Its
functional role therein must be to embed token sensory states for display to the
wider network. I lack a detailed notion of the requisite functional role, but with the
need for convention removed there seems no obvious bar to positing such a sub-
personal state or function.
The suggestion may be that this is proto-quotation, the primordial form
underpinning, or logically preceding, the linguistic sorts we engage in. Analogously,
linguistic reference is often considered derivative upon the capacity for mental
reference. Nobody has uncovered the mechanics of mental reference. But few are in
any doubt that there is such a thing. I am proposing something similar for the
primitive mental quotation of QHOTs.62 It’s notable that discussions of linguistic
quotation sometimes stray into speculating that non-linguistic items can be
linguistically quoted—as with Searle’s California Jay birdcall.63 All we need
imagine, additionally, is that a non-linguistic item might be non-linguistically
quoted—or at least, not in a public language. That would give us the sort of existent
which is a QHOT.
Things, sentient agents excepted, do not present themselves—something else is
required to present them. That is the need for a second mental state to display a
sensory state, which mental display of a mental state is that in which state
consciousness consists. The idea is clear enough that the sensory content featured in
60 See Reimer (1996) §3 for the distinction. It is often held that a demonstrative requires a demonstration
to ground it.
61 E.g. Searle (1969), Reimer (1996).
62 This would fit a Searlian ‘mind first’ approach to language.
63 Searle (1969: 76).
2726 S. Coleman
123
the conscious mental state is supplied by the first-order state, which latter cannot,
alone, present this content to the cognitive economy. But what corresponds
mentally, or in the brain, to the embedding of a token in linguistic quotation? One
natural suggestion is that the sensory state is literally embedded in the QHOT,
becoming a proper part of the composite completed QHOT. By contrast, in simple
SR theory the sensory state is an improper part, and in Kriegel and Rosenthal’s
theories no part, of the awareness-supporting state. We may add the condition that
(typically) a sensory state causes a QHOT to embed it. Once embedded, however,
the primary semantic mechanism is plain part/whole constitution: the main
precedent for this comes from theories of linguistic quotation. In Searle’s theory
a token sound is quoted by becoming a literal part of the quoting sentence.64
Constitution is also a semantic mechanism in the Balog/Papineau theory of
phenomenal concepts. Finally, we may recall that Kriegel’s indirect self-represen-
tation—his key to consciousness—relies on constitution: the directly represented
must partially compose the indirectly represented.65 QHOTs make one aware of
sensory states, and the ‘of’ is indeed that of intentionality. But it’s false that this ‘of’
demands to be understood representationally.66 Something can be an intentional
object by being contained—literally a content. The content of a completed QHOT
includes its embedded sensory state.
A useful analogy is the picture frame. A frame’s function is to display a
particular picture, and the relationship between frame and picture is that the latter is
embedded in the former. There is no question that, by convention or in any other
way, a given frame could really pertain to—be displaying—some picture in the
gallery other than the one it physically encloses. Containment, then, has what it
takes to be a primitive intentional relation. This sort of relation also has explanatory
promise in neuroscience. Following Feinberg,67 one might envisage disparate brain
areas implicated in conscious experience as forming ‘nested hierarchies’, where
‘lower order elements’, instead of being dispensable products of earlier processing,
actually help to ‘make up’ the final conscious percept. In a nested hierarchy,
Feinberg says, ‘the elements comprising the lower levels of the hierarchy are
physically combined or nested within higher levels to create increasingly complex
wholes’. This description recalls QHOT theory.
A near relation of the Papineau/Balog theory is worth mentioning here. Chalmers
2003 (see also Gertler 2001) develops a model of phenomenal concepts that leans
heavily on constitution (what Gertler calls ‘embedding’)68 to ground the relevant
mental intentionality. Chalmers claims ‘direct’ phenomenal concepts ‘take up’ a
phenomenal quality into themselves in a way that issues in a peculiarly intimate
64 Searle (1983: 184). See also Washington (1992).
65 Cf. also Frege’s (1892/1962) view that quotational semantics are fixed simply by the identity of the
embedded token with the expression talked about.
66 As against premise 3 of Lycan’s ‘simple argument’ for HO representationalism (2001). Were Lycan
correct no direct realist could hold that a perceptual state was about an environmental object just by being
partly composed of that object. QHOT theory is thus akin to ‘inner direct realism’.
67 Feinberg (2000) (see p. 79 for the quoted phrases below). I found the view in Gennaro (2012).
68 See her (2001, p. 308) for an account of embedding.
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form of intentional relation.69 What’s especially interesting for our purposes is that
Chalmers turns to constitution as a semantic mechanism because of the inadequacy
he finds in conventional naturalist—i.e. causation-based representational—accounts
of content. He argues that whichever conventional naturalist relation one employs
fails to pin down the content of a phenomenal concept (a ‘zombie’ phenomenal
concept remains conceivable). This sort of argument is now a staple of the
‘phenomenal intentionality’ approach to mental content.70 Chalmers claims the
relation between a phenomenal concept and the phenomenal quality it speaks of is
‘tighter’ than any causal relation, hence he invokes constitution to turn the trick. We
needn’t side with Chalmers in adducing the wholesale failure of naturalist
approaches to intentionality. However, given their failure thus far to reductively
analyse aboutness, it would be ironic, in light of Chalmers’ resort to constitution, if
someone suggested that, regarding QHOT theory, constitution was an inadequate
ground for mental intentionality, and urged us instead towards conventional
naturalist causation-based mechanisms! Constitution, then, is the ‘psychologically
real relation’71 that binds a QHOT and its first-order sensory target. They are sealed
as a unit, a real composite existent, by the new powers of the complex: this now
displays the embedded sensory content to wider cognitive systems, for use.
Chalmers and Gertler are, admittedly, anti-naturalists. But this isn’t due to the
centrality of constitution in their model of phenomenal concepts. Chalmers must
argue from his model towards an anti-naturalist conclusion—in the limited form of
observing that his theory would prevent the Papineau-style phenomenal concept-
based response to anti-physicalist arguments. It does not follow that, because
causation/representation don’t suffice to secure the mental intentionality required for
consciousness, naturalism is in trouble, simply because constitution carries no threat
to naturalism. How could it? What is more mundane? Mother nature uses whatever
materials she has to hand—and the constitution relation is an unglamorous, but
economic, means of tightly integrating two existents: in our case a quotational mental
state and the sensory content it displays. Chalmers, significantly, sharply distin-
guishes mental-access-via-constitution from the troublesome acquaintance relation.
Obviously more remains to be said, but it needn’t be said to make the model
viable. At this level of theorising we aren’t required to produce detailed functional
analyses, let alone specific proposals for their physical implementation.72 Science-
69 He also says the direct phenomenal concept’s content ‘is partly constituted by an underlying
phenomenal quality’ (p. 235) and talks of a ‘slot’ in the concept for a quality (p. 243).
70 See e.g. Loar (1995), Horgan and Graham (2009) for this critique of conventional naturalism.
71 Kriegel’s (2009) phrase. Jehle and Kriegel (2006: 471) say such a relation must involve something
‘actually happening’ and be ‘temporally thick’, i.e. more than merely dispositional. Constitution clearly
qualifies.
72 Though it is tempting to co-opt the model Lau (e.g. 2008. See also Lau and Passingham 2006)
develops for implementation of HOT theory, where dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex activity represents a
signal in the visual cortex (for visual consciousness). On QHOT theory, the idea would be that the dlpfc
provides the QHOT, and embeds (for display) the visual cortex activity, via projections from the latter to
the former. That would give us a large composite brain state for the completed QHOT, but still some way
short of the global brain states Van Gulick entertains. However see Gennaro (2012) ch. 9 for interesting
critique of Lau’s model of HOT implementation.
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fiction devices offer an analogy: an imagined item is precisified enough to be
functionally distinguished from actual and possible peers, but rarely any further. For
instance, one specifies a teleporter, as distinguished from a spaceship or train, by
saying one travels to one’s destination instantaneously and discontinuously (without
crossing every intervening spatial point). After that the internal mechanics, and
implementation, of teleportation are moot, and these specifics are not part of
theorising the model. The model’s job is to guide and constrain the work of
implementation, if we get round to producing the item.73 In our case, we have
functionally specified the QHOT structure with respect to its peers: in QHOT
theory, uniquely, the sensory state is a proper part of the awareness-supporting state
and its content, unaltered, is an improper part of the experienced content. By
contrast, on non-relational HOT and sophisticated SR theories the sensory state is no
part of the awareness-supporting state, and its content is no part of the experienced
content.74 Further, QHOTs make sensory states available to other cognitive systems,
by presenting them. That might make the proposal sound like access consciousness
supports phenomenal consciousness. Actually the relation is the reverse: this
network role is the upshot of the quotational display, not its basis.75 As Kriegel
suggests, access consciousness is dispositional (cognitive availability), and demands
a categorical basis, which is likely where phenomenal consciousness comes in. Any
good theory of phenomenal consciousness should then have an eye for how this
occurrent property supports access consciousness—in this respect QHOT theory
excels. In fact, more than making a sensory state available to the wider network, in
presenting it the QHOT positively directs network attention to it. In that sense the
sensory content becomes endorsed by the system.76 And this is what we find in
consciousness: a sensory state placed unavoidably right before us, for use in
executive action.
v. Still, quotation relies on the audience’s (or user’s) prior awareness of the quoted
item, so such a device cannot be used to analyse awareness.
Quotation as we’re familiar with it involves ‘audience’ awareness. But to claim
consciousness of a mental state is needed so as mentally to quote it demands
demonstration of some constitutive tie between quotation and sentience. We may
73 Consider the development path to tablets from similar devices as featured on Star Trek.
74 To complete the roundup: On simple SR theory the sensory state is an improper part of the awareness-
supporting state, and its content is (likely) a proper part of the experienced content: we have a single state
with ‘two-faced’ content. On Gennaro’s WIV the sensory state is a proper part of the awareness-
supporting state, if we take Gennaro at his word, but, though he strives to involve sensory content in
consciousness, the tensions we observed in his position will likely result in his rejecting first-order content
as part of experienced content. It is even possible that for Gennaro first-order states lack content of their
own—since he does not believe in qualitative content existing independently of HO representation. On
Van Gulick’s HOGS theory the sensory state is a proper part of the awareness-supporting state, and its
content—transfigured by HO representing—is a proper part of the experienced content.
75 There’s nothing incoherent in the idea of quotation or display that happens to find no audience.
76 Similarly, regarding Dennett’s (1991) idea of consciousness as ‘cerebral celebrity’, QHOT theory
makes quotational display the ground of cerebral celebrity, instead of cerebral celebrity grounding
consciousness.
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compare the situation of intentionality: it used to be thought that intentionality
presupposes consciousness (some still believe this). But it has proven profitable to
the naturalistic project, notably to cognitive science, to suppose content can exist
prior to consciousness. Given this assumption—helpful in modeling the interaction
of unconscious with conscious contentful brain states—we try to provide
naturalistic models of intentionality. But want of a worked-out implementation
doesn’t (broadly speaking) undermine widespread confidence that intentionality is
not consciousness-dependent, and can be naturalised—indeed, that conscious
intentionality is explicable in its terms. Similarly, when Newton published Principia
he was accused of reinstating entelechies; it was felt, regarding the posit of gravity,
that the only things that could tend towards one another were agential. It has, again,
proven beneficial to naturalism to presume such movements don’t demand agency,
and attempt a physical model of gravity and other forces. The pattern is this: it often
proves useful to naturalists to ascribe some capacity to the non-sentient, non-
agential world hitherto attributed exclusively to sentient beings, in the hope,
ultimately, of explaining how that world is set up to contain such beings. Having
made this ascription, conceptual work is done so the attribute in question is no
longer felt to require sentience or agency, and conceptual/empirical work is done
towards modeling it naturalistically. QHOT theory advocates the same move
regarding quotation, to explain consciousness. We must drop this ambition if it can
be shown quotation presupposes consciousness, but we’re within rights to await this
argument and consider it in due course. For my part I don’t find the notions of
quotation (sampling), display or exhibition are incapable of an agent-free
interpretation. A special danger lurks for analyses of consciousness: the closer we
get to the right answer the greater the risk of the key ingredient appearing to
presuppose consciousness; for, if the analysis is correct, that ingredient entails
consciousness. One misstep and we are apt to confuse entailment for presupposition.
The claim of QHOT theory is that mental quotation certainly entails, but does not
presuppose, consciousness. To be clear, quotation may require mentality—if so non-
conscious mentality will do.
vii. Are QHOTs literal linguistic structures?
They may be, e.g. if language of thought theory is found plausible. But arguably a
mere demonstrating pointer suffices: quotation needn’t be linguistic (consider finger
quotes). The pointer might be understood, like Rosenthal’s HOTs, as an assertoric
thought—since it can only display an occurrent sensory state to the subject. That
might count as a non-linguistic species of assertion, and would provide the indexical
elements of linguistic presentation without need of language. But QHOT theory also
resembles higher-order perception theory, not least in that first-order states are
presented not represented.77 It seems possible to read QHOT theory as more HOT-
or HOP-like according to one’s preference. Still, it has been argued, and I
sympathise, that the difference between HOT and HOP theories is ultimately
77 Van Gulick (2000). Still proponents hold, what QHOT theory denies, that the HO component fixes
experienced content (Lycan 1996).
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superficial.78 A major dissimilarity might appear the employment of concepts in
HOTs—but some consider perception to be conceptual. Again, perceptions have
been counted thoughts, under a wide understanding. So I am content to retain the
name quotational higher-order thought theory and leave open the issue whether
QHOTs involve concepts.79 Some object that animals, also children, may lack the
cognitive sophistication for HO structures. First, this is no special problem for
QHOT theory, and I defer to the defences of other HO theorists.80 Second, QHOT
theory if anything makes animal/infant consciousness easier to compass: QHOTs
are non-representational, and, on one construal, needn’t involve concepts.
14. Though not a HO representational theory, QHOT theory remains a HO theory
of consciousness. Many first-order sensory states lie outside consciousness. It takes a
mental operation on mental states—quotational display—to make them conscious.81
78 See e.g. Van Gulick (2000), Gennaro (2004).
79 One of Gennaro’s reasons for including concepts in HOTs is that ‘A conscious state must be presented
to its owner in some way or other’ (2012: 86). But QHOTs precisely do not colour the content they make
conscious. But thoughts are composed of concepts, so how is this a higher-order thought theory? That
concepts indeed compose thoughts doesn’t imply some thoughts aren’t constituted differently, as per the
‘pointer’ described above. It follows that phenomena Gennaro and Rosenthal explain via HOTs’ concepts
(e.g. experienced wine-tasting) QHOT theory must explain using FO states’ concepts. An account is
beyond the present paper: but any conceptual footwork conducted at the HO level can be performed down
below instead.
80 E.g. Gennaro (2004)—not least, he reminds us (§1) that animals and infants have cortexes.
81 Picciuto (2011) develops a superficially similar HO account of consciousness, ‘the quotational view’
(QV). Though QHOT theory and QV agree consciousness involves embedding a sensory state in a HO
state, they differ in crucial respects:
i. For Picciuto phenomenal concepts are implicated in consciousness, not just in thoughts about
experiences as per the Papineau/Balog account. But QHOTs may not be conceptual at all, and certainly
don’t involve phenomenal concepts (concepts of phenomenal states). If there are no phenomenal concepts
(as Tye 2009 argues) then QV fails, whereas QHOT theory is untouched. ii. Picciutto understands his HO
quotational structures as ‘demonstratives’ which refer to embedded sensory states and represent them as
states of the subject. QHOTs demonstrate sensory states but are not demonstratives, nor do they refer to
embedded sensory states, and they do not represent them (let alone as states of the subject)—but simply
present them. iii. Picciutto says quotational embedding ‘activates’ a sensory state, suggesting an intrinsic
modification, like acquisition of an ‘inner glow’. On QHOT theory awareness is held just to consist in a
sensory state’s mental quotation, with said state intrinsically unaltered. Piciutto’s talk of activation recalls
constitutive HO accounts, with associated problems. iv. On QV the quotational HO structure is ‘part of’
the ‘conscious state’ (§5.3), meaning we are conscious of the quotational element. On QHOT theory we
are conscious only of what the QHOT embeds, i.e. the sensory state. The QHOT itself is not conscious.
This creates a problem for QV. Picciutto’s hypothesis is that quotational embedding in a phenomenal
concept makes a mental state conscious. But if we are conscious of the quotational element of a
completed consciousness-enabling phenomenal concept, then, by the hypothesis, that quotational frame
must be embedded in another quotational phenomenal concept (assuming it cannot ‘self-quote’). If this
concept’s quotational element is also conscious then it requires embedding in a third phenomenal concept,
and we are headed for an unhelpful regress, to explain how the quotational element of one of Picciutto’s
concepts can be conscious. The other, more plausible, option is that the quotational element of a
quotational phenomenal concept does not require quotational embedding to be conscious. But then it
follows that being quotationally embedded isn’t needed for consciousness, against QV. QV thus faces a
dilemma: infinite regress or explanatory failure. Since an infinite regress never arrives, we actually have
explanatory failure on both horns. QHOT theory avoids this by denying QHOTs are conscious. Piciutto
might posit a phenomenal concept, embedding a sensory state, that is then embedded in a further
phenomenal concept which is unembedded, so unconscious. This unwieldy structure would be erected to
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